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This paper gives a brief survey of the WAI 262 claim, and the Tribunal Report, in Aotearoa
New Zealand. Colloquially known as the Native or Indigenous Flora and Fauna Claim, WAI
262 was the ﬁrst whole of government claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, requiring a
commission of enquiry to investigate how New Zealand constitutes intellectual and cultural
property regimes in relation to Māori peoples across the spectrum of governance, from arts
and cultural production to medical research, language, and broadcasting. I give a brief
summary of the claim and report, but focus primarily on the ways in which languages of
cultural difference and incommensurability are mediated within this quasi-legal framework.
I argue that rather than presenting ontologically incompatible frames of ‘culture’, which is
ultimately disempowering for indigenous people in the context of the settler-colony,
indigenous alterity is a strategy to assert and reorganize the foundations of sovereignty. The
strategic relationship between governance, sovereignty, and property regimes has become a
zone of contestation and indigenous cultural production.
Introduction
Anthropologyhas a number of enduring questions,manyofwhich revolve around questions of differ-
ence.What is the nature of (cultural) difference?Where do the boundaries of difference lie?Howdoes
cultural difference inform the possibility of understanding, translating, and exporting values, ideas,
and ways of being across time and space? These questions have underscored the anthropology of
property relations, and they underscore the anthropology of settler-colonies – both founded on the
question of how singular forms (of property, political authority, and governance) develop in
society, and how they have historically been mapped onto others.
The anthropology of property has long engaged with the idea of radical cultural difference.
The distinction between gift and commodity has often equated models of property with contrast-
ing models of exchange and by extension social organization. In Mauss’ inﬂuential essay on The
Gift,1 he was less invested in mapping differences between gift and commodity onto different cul-
tural locales, but rather used the nascent anthropology of exchange in places such as the North
West Coast and New Zealand (NZ) to argue for an expanded genealogy of property in Europe,
pointing out the forms of social contract that underpinned the emergence of capitalism, which
in the twentieth century were increasingly obscured by models of the free market.2 The Gift is
in fact an extended argument for how we might rethink our own political and economic
systems and rediscover, using the lens of cultural difference in the present, alternative genealogies
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of ownership and exchange within our own societies. Here, I want to follow this logic of cultural
difference as a heuristic into a shared, yet comparative, framework, into the case of the WAI 262
claim and report in Aotearoa New Zealand.
Similar to the anthropology of property, the anthropology of settler-colonies is fundamentally
concerned with the question of difference: underlying many ethnographies is the question of
whether the logic of radical cultural difference ultimately curtail or liberate indigenous peoples
from their ongoing condition of colonialism?3 I want to argue here, that like the dichotomy of
gift/commodity, the notion of radical difference in the condition of settler-colonialism can also
be understood as an analytic straw man, and might rather be used, like the notion of the gift,
to imagine an alternative blueprint for national governance of property. It is clear that asking ques-
tions about the nature of difference is itself a political act. Whilst it seems impossible to talk about
indigenous difference and colonial culture in the same breath except in terms of their opposition,
in my own work, rather than focusing on the ways in which indigenous culture was radically
different pre-contact, and might remain so into the present, I prefer to look at the ways in
which discourses of difference themselves have become powerful tools in anti-colonial struggle
and also in the perpetuation of (settler-) colonial logics.
In this article, I explore the modeling of difference in the settler-colony by examining how an
indigenous property claim in Aotearoa New Zealand presents a reimagining of entitlement and
property and is also conﬁned by the logic of settler-colonial property relations. Colloquially
known as the ‘Native Flora and Fauna Claim’, WAI 262 (the two hundred and sixty-second
claim to the Waitangi Tribunal) instantiated a critique and a delineation of indigenous intellectual
property rights under a condition of supposedly shared sovereignty. The claim and the subsequent
ﬁndings of the Tribunal are an excellent case study with which to think about how models of cul-
tural difference are laid onto property rights and relations, how property rights and relations are
used to justify sovereignty regimes and resistances, and how prevailing state property regimes are
intrinsically settler-colonial in nature, coopting resources on behalf of the nation but in fact expro-
priating resources for the state. The discussions in NZ about law, the policing by government of
rights, and the recognition of indigenous entitlement, also expose the interdependence of dis-
courses of cultural difference and the constitution of sovereignty in the settler-colony. The per-
spective I present here is one of an outsider who has long been tracking the ways in which
intellectual and cultural property are in the process of being indigenized, especially in the
South Paciﬁc.4 Here, I draw my analysis less from my ethnographic research, and more from pub-
licly accessible documents and formal and popular discourses about the WAI 262 claim and about
indigenous intellectual property rights in Aotearoa New Zealand and beyond.
Beyond the settler-colony?
NZ is a (formerly British) settler-colony, now vibrantly multicultural, with signiﬁcant populations
of more recent immigrants from Asia and the Paciﬁc Islands living alongside indigenous Māori
and Pākehā (people of European/British descent). The emergence of ‘biculturalism’ in the 1970s
as a guiding ethos for governance, and a representational frame for the nation, honored the 1840
Treaty of Waitangi that formally created the nation through a partnership between Māori and the
British government, promising Māori certain kinds of sovereignty in exchange for ceding certain
kinds of governance.5 There were two ofﬁcial versions of the Treaty (English and Māori) and
several circulating copies that differed on crucial points of translation and interpretation. The
version of the Treaty most consistently recognized consists of a preamble and three articles.
Article I of the English version signs the rights of ‘sovereignty’ in NZ over to the British
crown. In the Māori version, something quite different (kāwanatanga, usually translated as gov-
ernorship) was granted to the Crown. Article II promises in English to protect Māori in the
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exclusive and undisturbed possession of their properties. In Māori, they were guaranteed tino ran-
gatiratanga (usually translated today as sovereignty) – Māori authority and control – over their
lands, forests, ﬁsheries ‘me o rātau taonga katoa’ (everything they valued, their estate, their treas-
ured things). Article III states, in English, that everyone in NZ would have the rights and privi-
leges of British subjects.6
The complex ambiguities around national and indigenous rights, and a discursive environ-
ment that polarized indigenous and other stakeholders in the nation have been textually and dis-
cursively, enshrined since 1840 and much political reform in NZ over the past three decades has
been undertaken with the Treaty in mind. However, NZ has been constitutionally separated from
the British Crown since 1947; it no longer makes sense to conceptually divorce Māori and Crown.
There are Māori members of Parliament and Māori political parties, there is currently a Māori
Governor General, and there are fully established Māori departments of government such as
Te Puni Kōkiri, responsible for Māori public policy and policy effecting Māori.7 Documents
such as the UN Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (passed in 2007 and ratiﬁed
by NZ in 2010) and the Convention for Biological Diversity (1992) have also become instrumen-
tal documents in consolidating indigenous rights in the nation-state. In the present, the language
of self-determination and sovereignty is increasingly superseding the language of biculturalism in
the many indigenous rights movements.8 In turn, the structural reforms of NZ’s economy, follow-
ing global patterns of neoliberal development have led the Government to limit retroactive claims
and cap the time period for Treaty and Tribunal hearings, moving away from the restrictive obli-
gations of the Treaty toward a more expansive, ‘free market’ orientation.9 As prominent Māori
scholar and activist, Graham Hingangaroa Smith noted in 1997:
One of the more interesting things that has happened here in New Zealand is of course the deliberate
attack on the Treaty, because the Treaty has been the one instrument that has held up the progress of
successive governments of going wholly into alliances with other countries overseas and I am left in
no doubt as to the fact that is the very reason why the government is very keen on seeking a full and
ﬁnal settlement on Treaty grievances. I guess they feel that they can get rid of the Treaty by the year
2010 in order to make New Zealand a completely open marketplace.10
Whilst the Treaty has not disappeared as Smith suggested it might, I suggest we might use the
WAI 262 report (released in 2011) to ask how treaty principles and commitments are currently
shaping up.
Despite this shift toward a global indigenous rights environment, coupled with a global dom-
inance of neoliberal model for state economies, since 1840 vernacular debates over the instrumen-
tal differences between governance and sovereignty, the deﬁnition of what is to be treasured
(called taonga in the Treaty), and the status of Māori as ‘citizens’ have been vigorously discussed
in Aotearoa New Zealand. These debates occur on marae (ritual and community centers), in
people’s homes, and in the media – they are a part of the everyday experience of living in NZ
and many people have strong opinions about and are able to discuss the politics of a public
versus indigenous commons, the idea of a national commons, and the pragmatics of indigenous
exceptionalism.11
The limits of sovereignty are also prominently discussed within the Waitangi Tribunal, a com-
mission of enquiry established in 1975 to evaluate the ways in which the Treaty has been upheld
and to provide redress for the history of, and ongoing, Treaty violations that continue to undergird
national policies. We might perceive the tribunal to be a manifestation of the state’s conscience, a
kind of Jiminy Cricket. Since 1975, the Tribunal has heard claims from nearly every iwi (tribe).
Broader claims, contesting governance over the foreshore and seabed, the radio spectrum, and
ﬁsheries (amongst others) have often proved to be lightening rods for popular discourses
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around indigenous entitlement and its legitimacy. The Tribunal’s reports are measured and com-
prehensive, and are now also important artifacts of oral history and testimony. Their proposed
rulings, although they carry signiﬁcant moral and discursive weight, are extra-legal and generally
non-binding. For many, they represent the failings as well as the success of the shared enterprise
of sovereignty in the settler-colony.
WAI 262
The WAI 262 claim was lodged in October 1991 on behalf of six Māori individuals and asserted
indigenous ownership over the natural and cultural world of Aoteaora. It is often referred to as
the Native or Indigenous Flora and Fauna Intellectual and Cultural Property claim.12 The claim
explicitly appropriated the discourse and framework of intellectual and cultural property rights
and claimed that the NZ government had failed in its treaty obligations when developing its
intellectual property (IP) regime especially when they acceded to various international conventions
and agreements, such World intellectual property organization (WIPO)’s trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights (TRIPs) agreement, which is disinterested in the internal obligations
within nations to other sovereign constituents. The WAI 262 claim was wide-ranging and was
the ﬁrst ‘whole of government’ Tribunal hearing, in which different agencies across the full spec-
trum of governance were consulted and evaluated. In spring 2011, after nearly 20 years of hearings
and deliberations during which time almost all of the original claimants and one of the Tribunal
judges passed away, the Tribunal published a 1000-page report that summarized the claim, and
drew conclusions as to the responsibilities and obligations of the NZ state to uphold Māori property
rights. The claim provides an excellent opportunity to analyze how intellectual property rights have
become a ﬁlter for thinking about sovereignty; the ways in which Māori and the NZ state imagine
what indigenous intellectual property might be and how it might work; and how much this discus-
sion continues to be informed by the logic of settler-colonialism.
Imagining an alternative, making the claim
The origins of the WAI 262 claim lie in the intense activism of the 1970s in which numerous
Māori organized to resist and challenge the status quo of national government. It was drafted
by lawyer Moana Jackson in collaboration with Haana Murray (Ngāti Kurī), Hema Nui a
Tawhaki Witana (Te Rarawa), Te Witi McMath (Ngāti Wai), Tama Poata (Ngāti Porou), Kataraina
Rimene (Ngāti Kahungunu), and John Hippolite (Ngāti Koata) on behalf of themselves and their
six iwi.13 As cultural practitioners and leaders, the claimants already had long-standing concerns
about Māori access to land, and the state appropriation and management of other natural
resources, and became concerned that Māori were cut out of NZ’s participation in a wide
variety of international treaties and agreements regarding the commercial exploitation of plants
and animals. For instance, they were concerned about the ways in which the NZ government
was commodifying the kūmara (sweet potato) both nationally and internationally;14 and they
were worried about the exploitation and conservation of other indigenous ﬂora such as harikeke
(ﬂax) and the knowledge associated with them for cultural production and sustenance.15 Their
concerns kick-started a series of public discussions about the relationships between intellectual
property legislation, Treaty obligations, and Māori understandings of the ways in which the
environment, and culture, might be ‘owned’. The WAI 262 claim was made on behalf of six
Māori all from different iwi, but was holistic in its claims to deﬁne and frame indigenous
rights for all Māori.
In the delicate balance of the settler-colonial legal regime, the WAI 262 claim was radical in a
number of ways: it articulated tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and kaitiakitanga (guardianship)
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as explicit forms of resource management, alternative to the language of the prevailing State intel-
lectual property regime. It challenged the State to really incorporate Māori concepts into its
economy as well as its government, arguing that the Crown had failed to uphold its obligations
to protect the tino rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga over indigenous ﬂora and fauna, stating that
the Crown failed to protect these taonga by agreeing to ‘international agreements and obligations
that affect indigenous ﬂora and fauna and intellectual property rights and rights to other taonga’.16
It explicitly addressed the deﬁnition of sovereignty over resources allocated to Māori in article
two of the Treaty, articulating a holistic account of indigenous property rights as a form of sover-
eignty. It did this by expansively linking nature and culture, connecting native plants and animals
to traditional Māori knowledge (including carving, weaving, symbols and designs) and using this
to redeﬁne the State intellectual property regime by declaring that article two of the Treaty, which
gave Māori self-determination over all their treasures, also referred to the environment that Māori
inhabited and their natural resources. The entire contents of this holistic domain were deﬁned as
taonga rather than property: ‘all elements of a tribal group’s estate, material and non-material,
tangible and intangible’.17
The claim made speciﬁc reference to the ways in which the NZ government had managed
decision-making authority over conservation and proprietorial interests in indigenous plants
and animals. It argued that the Crown had a duty to ‘place mechanisms to ensure it can meet
its obligations to Māori under the Treaty prior to entering into any international agreements’
(Claim 1.1(a), para 14.10). The claim asserted that there had been inadequate consultation with
Māori around these issues and that ‘the Crown continues to develop practices, policies, and legis-
lation which will have an adverse impact upon Māori rights to indigenous ﬂora and fauna’ (Claim
1.1(a), para 17.1(k).18 In turn, it also contained iwi-speciﬁc claims against speciﬁc aspects of state
appropriation, asserting intellectual property rights to particular cultural images, designs and
symbols, expressions of culture (including photographs, audio-visual material, archives, and
museum collections), and knowledge and skills including those concerning indigenous ﬂora
and fauna.
The WAI 262 claim did more than instantiate a dichotomous imaginary that perceived indi-
genous and state ideas about intellectual property to be incompatible. The claim also observed
that such incompatibility was produced by the systematic overturning of Treaty rights and an
intentional denial of indigenous sovereignty and claims to self-determination. The claim
suggested an alternative: to re-center Māori ontology and epistemology as the foundations of a
national intellectual property regime that by deﬁnition was ﬁrst and foremost a cultural domain.
Property rights and sovereignty
The tension between cultural identity and economic entitlement, between ‘indigenous rights’ and
‘public good’ plays out in the curious kind of sovereignty that indigenous peoples hold in settler
societies. As commentators such as Cattelino,19 Comaroff and Comaroff,20 and Biolsi21 note,
indigenous sovereignty is limited by the extent to which the (other) nation-state imagines the pro-
priety of layering property relations and cultural rights onto one another.22 Commentator’s invest-
ments in one position or another expose that this is fundamentally a political issue: that the
boundaries of property rights mark the boundaries of the nation, of ‘civil’ society and constitute
what is ‘public’ in public culture and the cultural commons.23
Similar to the Seminole Indian take-over of the Hard Rock brand24 or the Royal Bafokeng’s
control of platinum mining in Southern Africa,25 Māori iwi are increasingly recognized by the
state as corporations. They may receive compensation and restitution from Treaty injustices in
the form of cash payments and economic rights have become a primary idiom through which cul-
tural speciﬁcity and colonial history are recognized and repaired. By staking a claim to deﬁne and
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hold intellectual property rights, indigenous groups such as Māori effect a reverse appropriation
of the colonial categories of intellectual and cultural property at the same time as they draw their
moral value and accountability into question. Within this innovative and critical legal environ-
ment, popular debates emerge about whether or not there is space within intellectual property
regimes to incorporate indigenous values or whether they are essentially different to one
another. This is the same discussion anthropologists have about the nature of cultural difference,
with much higher stakes.
Consistent to all of the individual assertions within the WAI 262 claim is the position that cul-
tural and natural worlds are united in Māori knowledge systems and narratives. For instance, as
Roberts et al. argue, the concept of whakapapa (genealogy) is both a cosmological frame and a
classiﬁcatory system through which to track relationships between humans, their ancestors and
their environment.26 Whakapapa, as a map of relatedness, also insists on a sometimes messy,
communal, and interconnected blueprint for modeling ownership. Māori knowledge systems
emphasize epistemological interconnections between knowledge of nature and culture – the
same word for relatedness, whakapapa, is used to track relationships within both domains. The
WAI 262 claimants insisted that te tino rangatiratanga (Māori sovereignty) be recognized as
the ultimate frame for allocating state-deﬁned property rights and that intellectual property
needs to be understood within the expansive political framework of indigenous rights.
Conventionally in so-called Western IP regimes, nature must be culturally modiﬁed before it
can be patented (although this is by no means stable and there are infamous exceptions). In this
way, the very concept of intellectual property is a good ﬁt for Māori activists who insist on
recognizing cultural knowledge and the natural world as intellectual property, i.e. inextricably
entangled with human creativity and society. The WAI 262 claimants argued that cultural iden-
tity is the a-priori condition for ownership, and that Māori knowledge (Matauranga Māori)
should be recognized as a template for indigenous intellectual property rights because it allo-
cated speciﬁc permissions and entitlements and legitimated indigenous forms of ownership.
The idea of ownership itself was modiﬁed to reﬂect the values of the concept of kaitiakitanga
(a term glossed as ‘guardianship’ understood more speciﬁcally by the Tribunal in its report as
meaning to ‘protect, preserve, control, regulate, use, develop, and/or transmit’ authoritative
relationships with taonga, 2006: 5). The claim therefore challenged the NZ government’s
rights to claim the natural resources of NZ by redeﬁning the basic categories of intellectual
property and ownership, arguing for the recognition of Māori authority, epistemology, and gov-
ernance. It does not deny the existence or applicability of intellectual property concepts, but
locates them within a Māori framework. This is not a cultural manifesto, written from the
outside, but a highly sophisticated argument for rethinking the alignments of indigenous
rights, culture, and national governance.
A comment by the eminent Māori scholar ArohoaMead exempliﬁes this. She is discussing the
registration of the second tier domain name, .Māori, in NZ:
As at Tuesday 1 October [2002] 398 names had been registered with Māori.nz domain demonstrating
a clear wish for Māori individuals and organizations to ‘brand’ themselves as Māori. In so doing they
are joining the global world voluntarily and enthusiastically and becoming active participants in the
developing national and global policies on e/commerce and the use of indigenous cultural and intel-
lectual property. I include this example… not only to illustrate the developments in Māori branding,
but to also highlight the values that underpin Māori initiatives. We do things differently.27
What is ‘different’ here? Is it the usage and cultural framing of the brand rather than the form of
the brand itself? Does this transform, and decolonize, the process of branding? Or does it further
co-opt indigenous peoples into the sweeping process of commodiﬁcation? What is different is the
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reorganization of power that might be effected if it were acknowledged that there were cultural
criteria for belonging to the domain .Māori.28
In many ways, WAI 262 has been one of the most important, and most contentious, claims to
the Tribunal, not only because it attempted to redeﬁne cultural and intellectual property, but also
because it explicitly acknowledges that these property forms in fact articulate the boundaries of
indigenous sovereignty. As one online commentator noted:
It is based on the rights of tangata whenua [people of the land], not on the principles of the Treaty, or
on rights to Aboriginal title in British law. Rather than focus on speciﬁc acts of the Crown in breach of
the Treaty of Waitangi, it questions the right of the Crown to rule at all. Additionally, it questions the
Crown’s presumption of rights over everything not known at the time of the signing of the Treaty/Te
Tiriti … I believe it is no overstatement to say this is revolutionary.29
For some in NZ, this vision is empowering, for others a great threat. Not surprisingly, the claim
fed the fears of commentators who presume that the blanket assertion of indigenous rights might
undermine ‘the commons’ and cut out the rational, natural rights of the state-controlled market, as
one right-wing pundit commented:
When will this race-based lust for power and control stop, you might well ask? It won’t – at least not
unless there are major changes. As long as there are special Māoriseats in Parliament with governing
parties willing to offer those MPs powerful coalition partnerships, it won’t stop. Not only will it not
stop, but the demands are gaining momentum to the point where non-Māori New Zealanders are
beginning to realise they are being increasingly marginalised by the cunning strategies of a greedy
tribal elite, that now has its hands on the levers of power and its ﬁngers in the public purse.30
Others assert that Māori culture is part of the cultural commons of the nation, and should be acces-
sible to all:
A dynamic and evolving Māori culture is an inextinguishable driver in my own Pakeha culture. Is my
Pakeha expression of that to be circumscribed as exploitation? Will I be denied the power of waiata,
haka and all the other cultural symbols that inevitably deﬁne the culture that enriches and nourishes us
all?31
The WAI 262 claim instantiates a position on intellectual and cultural property that contests the
authority of the nation-state to divorce culture and identity from entitlement and challenges the
insistence that property, even cultural property, in effect has no culture. It presents a revised ima-
ginary of a State intellectual property regime, using intellectual property as a frame to reimagine
and reframe the recognition of indigenous rights. As I shall describe in a moment, the Tribunal’s
report, and response to the claim, in turn reﬂects the ways in which these debates are perpetually
inﬂected with the power structures of the settler-colony, highlighting both alternative imaginaries
and limitations to practical alternatives.
The WAI 262 report
This report is a new lens through which our identity can be crystallised. It is the vehicle through which
our relationship with the Government can evolve. And it is the means by which our kaitiakitanga can
be entrenched for our future generations.32
Hearings from expert witnesses, claimants and the Government began in 1997 and ended in 2007.
Sections of the ﬁnal report, on Te Reo –Māori language, were released in April 2011 and the full
report presented to the Government in July of that year.33 The report presents a summary of
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hearings from a number of interested parties, from artists, business developers, graphic designers,
educators, and language specialists and representatives of government in all areas. Unlike the
claim, the report, as a product of the Tribunal, takes the imaginary of cultural difference and
incommensurability and renders it cogent within the broader language of state law, fusing the
language of Māori knowledge systems and intellectual property. However, rather than drawing
only on the language of existing legal regimes, the report also takes as its starting point the
language of the claim itself to create working deﬁnitions of its key terms. Following the claim,
the authors devise a template for deﬁning taonga: dividing taonga into works (cultural) and
species (natural), linked to Māoriby korero (stories, oral histories), whakapapa (genealogy),
and known kaitiaki (guardians). The term ‘kaitiaki relationship’ is used to specify the forms of
guardianship that arbitrate the authenticity of taonga and the entitlement to them. Within this fra-
mework, the report then evaluates the ways in which existing frameworks of intellectual and cul-
tural property do or do not protect the kaitiaki relationship and Māorirights in taonga, using the
Treaty as a framework referencing best practice. They also evaluate the extent to which the kai-
tiaki relationship can be applied, as a substitute, to the existing IP regime. Only once this cultural
framework has been established, do the report writers evaluate the current IP regime (focusing
especially on copyright, trademarks, and patent), current environmental legislation, and the
ways in which the state manages custodianship of these resources (from museums to ﬁsheries).
Chapters evaluate intellectual property in relation to taonga works (culture), genetic and biologi-
cal resources in relation to taonga species (nature), the environment, the conservation estate,
language (Te Reo), traditional healing practices (rongoā), the role of Crown control, and the
making of international instruments.
The report represents a very real struggle to conceptualize intellectual and cultural property in
the context of partnership, power sharing, and mutual obligation, underwritten by the Treaty, bal-
ancing the governorship promised by the Treaty to the Crown with Māori self-determination also
promised. The writers commence from what they term ‘a post-grievance climate for claim-
making’ aiming to overcome the dichotomies of biculturalism and imagine the state as a
system of governance taking into account the special relationship with Māori as treaty partners.
They follow the claimants in criticizing existing law for a failure to recognize collective and
enduring rights, to extend moral rights beyond their limited purview, and to support kaitiaki
and their role in protecting and conserving taonga works.34 The report lists many instances of
failed or inadequate consultation. For example, in the section on intellectual property in
taonga works, the writers noted:
All the parties before us acknowledged that the IP system in relation to copyright, trade marks, and
related rights is designed primarily to encourage commercial exploitation of a creator’s work, and
not to accommodate the interests of kaitiaki in their taonga works or matauranga Māori35
By addressing this neglect, the report writers go on tomake proposals throughwhichMāori could be
more readily acknowledged and institutionalized as stakeholders (although the report perpetuates a
divide between nature and culture, affording indigenous rights to culture but not acknowledging pro-
prietary rights to nature, taonga species). The report suggests potential alterations to the current IP
regimemost ofwhich focus on the acknowledgment that indigenous intellectual property rights need
to be translated into a recognizable and implementable bureaucratic regime. The report struggles to
conceptualize a regime that could marry the state law and property regimes taking intoMāori values
in terms not of their proprietary interests, but by deﬁnition the spirit of partnership. They conclude
that the current legal infrastructure is fundamentally unable to recognize the idea of guardianship,
and the complex, communal non-commoditized rights that this concept embodies and suggest a
number of ways in which this process of recognition could be institutionalized in law.
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The report delineates a possible program for the national integration of an indigenous frame-
work for intellectual property (for some forms of property) that hinges on the concept of guardian-
ship (kaitiaki relationships). At times, the kaitiaki relationship, as a right of inalienable connection
is recognized as a form of stakeholdership akin to ownership (e.g. with the right to exclude others
from producing and proﬁting from certain cultural images). At other times, the kaitiaki relation-
ship is interpreted as a stakeholder role more in the vein of a consultant or community of interest
(with the right to be consulted on the use of national parks, scientiﬁc research, but without an
exclusive right of ownership).
The report acknowledges that the existing IP system was not designed with the protection of
Māori knowledge systems in mind, but believes that existing structures (including international
agreements such as TRIPs) are not incompatible or intrinsically unsuited to such protection.
They propose the establishment of an intellectual property commission ‘composed of experts
in mātauranga Māori, IP law, commerce, science, and stewardship of taonga works and docu-
ments, assisted by a secretariat drawn from the same areas of expertise’ (702) that would ascer-
tain and register the kaitiaki and would ensure that consultation and collaboration would be in
place around their economic exploitation (kaitiaki, unlike intellectual property rights holders are
not term limited relationships). They also propose that alongside kaitaiki, Māori knowledge
systems (Mātauranga Māori) be allowed to deﬁne new relations of responsibility and
entitlement:
This approach is not intended to create a new category of proprietary right, but is rather a way of
recognising the relationship of kaitiaki with taonga works and some aspects of Mātauranga Māori
where it is proposed to exploit those things commercially. The kaitiaki right is inherently inalienable
and is therefore not a proprietary right in the orthodox Western sense. Rather it would be a statutory
participatory right in respect of decisions around proposals to exploit taonga works or Mātauranga
Māori commercially. It may in appropriate cases amount to a right of veto, and it must be perpetual.36
This is an important new form of indigenous entitlement for taonga works (cultural production).
With regards to Taonga species, the report proposes that consultation and partnership be better
institutionalized through government bodies such as Te Puni Kōkiri. Overall, the proposals of
the report focus on a greater level of bureaucratic framing to enforce and institutionalize the prin-
ciples of partnership.
The rights of kaitiaki are framed by the existing legal regime, not only because the report
writers overall believe that most legal instruments, even the TRIPs agreement are not incompa-
tible with a framework that focuses on indigenous rights and tino rangatiratanga, but also
because the very principles of partnership enshrined by the Treaty emerge from this legal frame-
work. This passage, in the conclusion of the section on genetic and biological resources of taonga
species, summarizes the tensions and encompassments of law and indigenous sovereignties:
The larger, central question is whether Māori interest and values should affect the way in which
research into the genetic and biological resources of taonga species is carried out and its out comes
exploited.
We have looked to the Treaty of Waitangi for guidance. We have concluded that the issue is best
resolved by reference to the concept of tino rangatiratanga as expressed in the Treaty’s Māori text,
rather than to the concept of exclusive ownership as expressed in article 2 of the Treaty’s English text.
Accordingly, we conclude that kaitiaki do not have rights in the genetic and biological resources of
taonga species that are akin to the Western conception of ownership. Only in the most rare and excep-
tional cases, like the tuatara, would we say kaitiaki are justiﬁed in claiming an interest in each living
specimen of a taonga species. Instead, we conclude that where there is a risk that bioprospecting, GM,
or IP rights will affect kaitiaki relationships with taonga species, those relationships are entitled to a
reasonable degree of protection. Just what is reasonable is a matter for case-by-case analysis.
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It requires a full understanding of the level of protection required to keep the relationship safe and
healthy, as well as a careful balancing of all competing interests.37
The writers identify the need to balance the obligations of the Crown to the treaty with other inter-
ests that ‘include the wider community interests in free access to information and ideas and the
ﬂourishing of creativity, and the interests of IP right holders in that creativity’38 – basically to
negotiate and balance with the existing IP regime. In the case of taonga species, what must be
protected is the kaitiaki relationship, but this is not recognized as intrinsic to the species itself.
The report therefore acknowledges indigenous entitlement to culture, but not to nature.
Conclusions
The report presents a vision of partnership, but ends with a vision of encompassment:
It would create, for the ﬁrst time in New Zealand’s history, a legal environment conducive to the long-
term survival of matauranga Māori and the kaitiaki relationship … a fair balance between the Treaty
rights of kaitiaki, the private rights of IP owners, and the interests of the public in the use of publicly
available works and access to the public domain.39
These seemingly contradictory statements encapsulate many of the tensions that are enshrined in
the settler-state, in which difference itself must be recognized and therefore made in some way
commensurable with the structures that provide recognition.40
WAI 262 was by no means the only attempt of indigenous groups to develop a recognizable
legal language that presents an alternative structuring of property rights, trying to work within and
subvert national legal regimes. Debates about the suitability of projects to redeﬁne intellectual
property rights are often smokescreens to the ongoing dispossession and failure to recognize indi-
genous sovereignties, even those initially established (via treaties) in state law. In February 2012,
the Indigenous Forum at WIPO unanimously decided to withdraw from negotiations around
forthcoming WIPO Treaties on Intellectual Property and Genetic Resources, Traditional Knowl-
edge and Folklore. This pragmatic and political action was made, not because of any ontological
incompatibility between indigenous peoples and national intellectual and cultural property
regimes but because the Indigenous Forum perceived that ‘The IGC, in its overall procedures,
has systematically ignored our rights, as Indigenous Peoples and as Nations with internationally
recognized collective rights, to self-determination and full and equitable participation at all
levels’.41 The Forum explicitly recognized that participation, consultation, recognition, self-deter-
mination were what constituted property rights. These practices, rather than the words, of law
were the mechanisms of both sovereignty and of economic entitlement.
In my very brief summary of thousands of pages of legal claim and response, and many years
of public debate, I have tried to draw out the ways in which the language of intellectual (and cul-
tural) property in fact interiorizes another language about difference and entitlement. This interior
dialog, within the framework of law and governance, is by no means unique to the settler-colony
but is also a decisive, ongoing debate in the negotiation of settler-colonial power relations. The
Tribunal report on the WAI 262 claim explicitly addresses both the bifurcation and entanglement
of indigenous and state ideas about ownership and tries to express ideas of difference using a
much more generic, global language of property rights. For the tribunal, this is divisive: They ulti-
mately note ‘kaitiakitanga focuses on obligations and relationships arising from kinship; property
focuses on the rights of owners’.42 This assertion naturalizes a rhetoric of a public, state commons
and by extension of individual ownership, by ‘recognizing’ it as a form of justiﬁed guardianship,
using the category of kaitiakitanga not even as a legal category, but as an expressive or discursive
gesture of good faith in the interventions it makes into policy. Similar to other Māori concepts
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(e.g. tino rangatiratanga), these terms are appropriated into state vocabulary,43 but as esthetic
frames, not necessarily categories for state reform. In this way, the report makes it very clear
that a non-indigenous nation-state still controls the ways in which indigenous intellectual property
is recognized and allowed to become emergent, even as it also suggests ways in which the state
might reimagine itself. In this way, the WAI 262 report exposes both the hopes and the complex-
ities of indigenous sovereignty claims in the settler-colony.
The WAI 262 claim parses a different language of difference to that usually associated with
the radical alterity suggested by settler-colonial logics (in which the settler and the colonized are
discursively separated even as the former controls and contains the latter). This other language of
difference uses Māori categories to encircle those of the state, and opens a space for us to imagine
a nation-state that is more than simply inﬂected with indigenous words, but which increasingly
internalizes indigenous categories, transforming its own property regimes. Following on from
my comments regarding difference at the very start, what is different is not so much the deﬁnition
of property, entitlement or ownership (although they become nuanced in very different ways) but
rather who the custodians of the categories are; who is allowed to have the power recognize and
name resources, and allocate entitlements. In the claim, these are traditional guardians (Kaitiaki)
rather than state ofﬁcials, although the suggestion is that they become one and the same.
By talking through the ways in which indigenous intellectual property is constituted within
the frame of the settler-colony, I have come to a couple of tentative conclusions. One is that
the dynamic of settler-colonialism is deﬁned by an imbalance of power that sit at the core of
not only governance, but which constitutes a politics of recognition and representation. To my
eye, the WAI 262 claim is a genuine rethinking of property from within an indigenous world-
view – a world-view that is within but solely deﬁned by the settler-colony. The report replaces
this world-view back within the frame of the settler-colonial state. The possibility of constituting
and implementing indigenous intellectual property categories and regimes lies more in the poten-
tial realignment of the structures of sovereignty, and the parceling out of rights and political auth-
ority than it does in the maintenance of radical models of difference between Western and
Indigenous categories and property regimes.
As an anthropology of cultural difference, the descriptive account I present here refuses to
layer conceptual models of difference onto divergent models of culture and ethnic-based identity.
It is clear that this connection is provocative and ideology-laden – be it within accounts that cri-
tique a disembedded free market and neoliberal model of governance (that advocate strong state
intervention and support), or within those that believe ﬁrmly in the paramount rights of individual
citizens above any other collective. Indigenous rights movements have long provided a provin-
cializing commentary to the descriptions of modernist property relations that in fact constitute
the settler-colony, presenting alternative genealogies of how political authority, exchange, and
entitlement may be zoned, regulated, and experienced.
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